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**THE POTENTIAL DRAIN OF
POTENTIAL BRAINS**

Robert Mattes
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CSSR Working Paper No. 91

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Democracy in Africa Research Unit

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POTENTIAL BRAINS

Robert Mattes
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CSSR Working Paper No. 91

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The Potential Drain of Potential Brains

Abstract

This paper investigates the extent, nature and causes of potential emigration in South Africa among young adults in tertiary institutions (South Africa's potential skills base). This study is based on a questionnaire designed by the Southern African Migration Project and administered by Markinor to a sample of 4,784 students from universities, technikons and nursing colleges. The study uses the methods of factor analysis and reliability analysis to determine which indicators are most adept at measuring potential emigration. The study then uses a multivariate regression analysis to determine which factors best explain potential emigration. Findings show that the strongest predictor is whether families would support or discourage students from moving, followed by students' perceptions of the lives of other individuals who have already moved, especially with regard to whether they lead better lives and have found jobs for which they were trained for. Potential emigration is also increased when students believe family prospects to be better overseas, information about overseas opportunities are more readily accessible and when they themselves perceive logistics to pose no great challenge. Potential emigration is decreased when patriotism is high. Interestingly, the study reveals that 'push factors' are less influential than 'pull factors' in explaining the likelihood of potential emigration. The paper concludes by outlining policy implications.

1. Introduction

As they approach graduation, highly educated young adults must begin to make important decisions about employment, career, marriage and family. In the early 21st century, increasing numbers of students around the world must also decide *in which country they want to pursue these plans.*

Things are no different in South Africa. Since being accepted as a full member of an increasingly interconnected family of nations, young South Africans can now look beyond their borders to find employment. Yet while greater opportunities and a wider range of choice may be good news for South Africa's talented tertiary students, it may also portend bad news for the country as a whole in the form of a momentous loss of skills. Skilled emigration can rob a

country of considerable investments in training and education, and can also rob an economy of needed skills and upper-end consumers (Stalker, 1997). Indeed, virtually all South African commentators have focussed on these negative aspects of skilled emigration.

Yet, many analysts argue that the word “loss” is misguided since emigration also brings gains (Martin *et al*, 2002). Émigrés not only remit income while abroad, but also tend to return home and bring advanced skills to pass onto their colleagues (Abella, 1997). Hence, Aderinto (1978) uses the term skills “transfer”. In fact, many argue that skills migration is not only a reality, but is also necessary in highly specialised societies for industrial growth and cultural exchange (Willis, 1974; Khadria, 1999).

While there has been a great deal of debate about the South African government’s *White Paper on International Migration* over the past ten years, we still lack a precise description of the extent of emigration from South Africa, as well as a clear grasp of its causes. For example, Statistics SA estimated total emigration from 1989 to 1997 to be approximately 82,000, including 11,000 “professionals”. Yet a study of South Africans living in just five countries abroad provided an emigration estimate of 232,000; 42,00 of whom were “professionals” (a category narrower than that of “skilled”) (Kaplan *et al*, 1999). Using census data, Van Rooyen (2000) argued that at least a million white South Africans emigrated between 1985 and 1996. Projection figures from a 1998 nationally representative survey of skilled adults estimated that approximately 2 percent, or 30,000 adults, had a “very high” probability of leaving within the next years, and another 160,000 had a “high” probability (Mattes & Richmond, 2000).

Kaplan *et al* (1999: 12) estimated that the skilled South Africans who emigrated in 1997 alone cost about 68 billion rand of investment in human capital. However, a brain drain is likely to be particularly damaging to an economy when skills leave relatively soon after training and governments fail to receive any appreciable return on direct investments in training.

In this paper, we attempt to assess *potential emigration* among South Africa’s *potential skills base*: that is, young adults in tertiary institutions, and also to test competing arguments that purport to explain the reasons behind South Africa’s “brain drain”.

2. Methodology

At the conceptual level, our target population was South Africa's *potential skills base*. We understand skilled persons to be those people who have received specialised training and possess key competencies and skills vital to the functional core of the economy (Mattes & Richmond, 2000: 21). Thus, a country's *potential skills base* consists of those people currently training to fill positions critical to that functional core.

Operationally, we defined South Africa's current potential skills base as consisting of people (1) studying at a South African tertiary institution (universities, technikons, or colleges), in (2) the final year of an undergraduate or postgraduate degree programme. However, when we began to attempt to gather data on the size of this population in 2002, we found that no national data base on tertiary student numbers existed, especially with regard to final year students. Thus, in mid 2002, we personally collected this data from registrars at each tertiary institution across the country.¹ Based on this definition, we estimate South Africa's potential skills base to be approximately 150,000 students (see Table 1).

We intended to draw a sample of 2,400 representative of this target population. In order to draw a representative sample of such a population, one would randomly select a pre-determined number of names from a list of all final year students. However, because no such list of students existed, we first had to cluster students into larger units that could be sampled. We initially investigated the possibility of compiling a list of final year classes or modules, but found that many tertiary institutions were unable to provide necessary data on the numbers of students in their classes.

What they were able to provide were reliable numbers of final year students enrolled in each faculty. Thus, at the first stage of sampling, we compiled a list of all teaching faculties at all tertiary institutions across the country and their respective final year student numbers. But because random selection, through pure chance, can over or under represent important subgroups within a population, we stratified the list of faculties according to the (1) type of institution (historically black or historically white); (2) level of institution (university, technikon or college); (3) type of degree (undergraduate or postgraduate) and (4) type of faculty. We drew a sample of faculties from the entire list, with the probability proportionate to its relative size. Due to the large

¹ With the exception of the University of Transkei which failed to provide the relevant information.

size of the sample relative to the total list, and because of the wide variance in the size of student populations across faculties, some very large faculties (for example, Wits Commerce Faculty) were selected more than once. Altogether, 74 undergraduate university faculties were selected, along with 92 postgraduate university faculties, 37 technikon faculties, and 3 nursing college faculties. Finally, because a purely proportionate sample would have resulted in a number of interviews at historically black institutions being too small to support robust statistical inference, we deliberately over sampled from this strata but re-weighted these interviews according to their actual proportion for final analysis (see Table 1).

Table 1. 2002 Final Year South African Tertiary Population and Sample

	<i>2002 Population</i>	<i>2002 Population %</i>	<i>Unweighted 2003 Sample % (n=4784)</i>	<i>Weighted 2003 Sample % (n=2400)</i>
<i>Type of Student</i>				
Undergraduate	97,285	62%	62%	59%
Post Graduate	59,810	38%	38%	41%
Total	157,095	100%	100%	100%
<i>Level of Institution</i>				
University	100,118	64%	63%	63%
Technikon	56,195	36%	35%	34%
Nursing Colleges	782	0.5%	2%	3%
Total	157,095	100%	100%	100%
<i>Faculty</i>				
Commerce	42500	27%	35%	26%
Law	5750	4%	3%	3%
Engineering	20517	13%	14%	14%
Science & Technology	15744	10%	8%	9%
Humanities	19820	13%	8%	12%
Education	22178	14%	13%	13%
Health Sciences	14948	10%	10%	10%
Management & IT	11228	7%	6%	5%
Medical/Dentistry	1653	1%	1%	2%
Theology	802	1%	1%	1%
Architecture	1173	1%	1%	1%
Nursing	782	0.5%	2%	3%
Total	157095	100%	100%	100%
<i>University Background</i>				
Historically White	81048	81%	80%	78%
Historically Black	19070	19%	20%	22%
Total	100,118	100%	100%	100%

Source: Final Year Student Population data collected by authors from Registrars.

In the second stage of sampling, our fieldwork provider (Markinor) was instructed to select randomly one class from each selected faculty (or for each time that a large faculty was selected).

The sample was also designed to contain a third stage in which 20 students would be randomly selected from each undergraduate class and 10 from each postgraduate class. This would have provided us with a total sample of 2,400 students. However, we ultimately decided to administer the questionnaire to all students in each selected class. Given that lecturers were already being generous in providing us with 20 to 30 minutes of their valuable lecture time to administer the questionnaire, the additional time needed to select which students would receive the questionnaire was prohibitive. As we wanted to administer the questionnaire at the beginning rather than at the end of the class (so students would not leave), it would have been impractical to administer the questionnaire to only some students, while others sat with nothing to do for the next half hour. Thus, the actual, unweighted sample size turned out to be 4,784. However, all cases were weighted back to the intended sample targets so that the weighted data was based on a sample of 2,400.

The self-administered questionnaire was designed by the *Southern African Migration Project* (SAMP) and usually took approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes for students to complete. Markinor personnel provided students with instructions to fill out the questionnaire, were available to answer questions throughout, and then collected the completed interviews and returned them to SAMP for data entry.

3. What Does South Africa's Potential Skills Base Look Like?

The country's potential skills base (as represented by final year students at the country's tertiary institutions) tends to be female (54 percent of those interviewed were women, 46 percent men), African (48 percent, compared to 40 percent white and 12 percent coloured and Asian) and young (the median age of the total sample is 22). While we have no time series data to draw a direct comparison, this undoubtedly reflects dramatic changes in the country's historically white tertiary institutions. By contrast, our 1998 survey of skilled adults found a population that was overwhelmingly male (61 percent) and white (72 percent) (Mattes & Richmond, 2000: 14-15).

Just under one half (46 percent) say they mostly speak an African language at home, of which, the largest proportion (14 percent) speak Xhosa. One quarter of the students say they speak English (27 percent) and another quarter speak Afrikaans (27 percent). By contrast, the 1998 research found that 45 percent of all skilled adults spoke Afrikaans (Mattes & Richmond, 2000: 14).

One quarter describe their family's socio-economic status as "upper class" (4 percent) or "upper middle class" (20 percent), and one third "middle class" (36 percent); one fifth say they are from a "working class" background (20 percent) and 15 percent classify their family as "lower class." One half of final years student say they have lived in a rural area, either in a rural farming area (25 percent) or a small town (26 percent). The rest say they come from a large town (13 percent) or city (36 percent).

What are they studying? Just over one third were completing a certificate or diploma (36 percent), and another third were completing a Bachelor's Degree (38 percent). One fifth of final year students were engaged in postgraduate study pursuing an Honours Degree (10 percent), Masters Degree (12 percent) or a Doctorate (less than 1 percent). The low number of Ph.D. candidates may reflect a bias in the classroom based setting of the sample, given that most Ph.D.'s in the South African system are obtained through individualised study. Four percent are pursuing some other form of degree.

4. Measuring Emigration Potential

We have already defined a country's potential skills base as those people currently training to fill positions critical to the functional core of the economy, and operationalised this population as people (1) studying at a South African tertiary institution (universities, technikons, or colleges), in (2) the final year of an undergraduate or postgraduate degree programme.

What is the potential for skills loss via emigration from this population of final year students? Conceptually, we argue that for a person to have a high level of "emigration potential," they should, at a minimum, have given emigration extensive thought, they should want to emigrate, and they should consider the possibility to be quite likely. Thus, we constructed a series of indicators designed to tap the breadth of the concept of "emigration potential."


While four in ten final year students (40 percent) say they have given "a great deal" of "consideration to moving to another country to live and work," it is

clear that as we ask more demanding questions that examine commitment and probability, numbers drop significantly. We first asked people to tell us what countries they would most likely go to if they ever had to leave South Africa (what is referred to as the “most likely destination” or MLD). We then posted a series of questions about possible movement to that country.

One quarter (28 percent) say they wanted “to a great extent” to “move” to their MLD to live and work for two years or more. One in five (21 percent) say that it is “very likely” that they would actually do this. Short-term emigration potential appears to be even higher. Four in ten (39 percent) say they want “to a great extent” to go to their MLD to live and work for less than two years. One quarter (27 percent) say it is “very likely” they would go actually go.

About one in five people said that it was “very likely” that they would leave the country within six months of graduation (18 percent). Similar numbers said they would leave within two years (15 percent) and within five years (18 percent).

Figure 1: Measuring Emigration Potential (All Final Year Students)



We then used Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis to test which of these indicators most effectively tapped the underlying concept of “emigration potential”. Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis confirmed that five indicators were the most effective in this regard. Based on this, we created an average *Index of Emigration Potential* and an “emigration potential” score for each respondent by summing respondents scores across the five items listed in Table 2 and dividing by five.²

Table 2. Scale Statistics for Emigration Potential

	<i>Mean (0-3 Scale)</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Factor Loading (Structure Matrix)</i>
To what extent do you want to move to your MLD to live and work for a long period (longer than two years)?	1.67	1.10	.79
How likely or unlikely is it that you would move to your MLD to live and work for a long period (two years or longer)?	1.47	1.08	.77
How much consideration have you given to moving to another country to live and work?	1.82	1.10	.49
How likely or unlikely is it that you would move from South Africa within five years after graduation?	1.34	1.10	.38
How likely or unlikely is it that you would move from South Africa within two years after graduation?	1.32	1.03	.35

Notes: N=3907. The unrotated factor has an Eigenvalue of 2.37 and explains 47.3 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) = .72

While the decimalised scores produced by this process are helpful in making fine grained distinctions in emigration potential amongst students based on varying combinations of responses to all five items in the index, we also wanted to create broader categories that could help us analyse broad differences in respondents. Following the method used in Mattes & Richmond (2000), we grouped respondents as follows: Those respondents who gave the most extreme responses to each item in terms of emigration were coded either as having a “Very High” emigration potential (3) or “No Potential” (0). We classified students with a score between 2.1 and 2.8 as having a “High” emigration

² All items had four point response scales (0 to 3) except the item on consideration, which had a three point scale. In order to put the responses onto the same scale, it was rescaled as 0, 1.5 and 3.

potential, and those between 2 and 1.5 as having a “moderate” potential etc (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Emigration Potential among All Final Year Students





Figure 3: Emigration Potential among Final Year Students in 2003 Compared to Skilled Adults in 1998



Compared to the 1998 survey of skilled adults, we see that the proportions of respondents with a “very high” emigration potential are exactly the same, while twice as many students have a “high” potential as did the adults (see Mattes & Richmond, 2000: 24).

5. The Nature of Potential Skills Emigration

We now turn to enquire about the nature of these emigration plans. Where do people want to go? How long do they want to stay? Will they return? And what will they take with them? While all respondents provided answers to these questions, we will focus on the responses of those people who are most likely to leave.

5.1 Where will People go?

We first asked students to tell us “If you were ever to leave South Africa, which country[s] would you most prefer to go to live?” (allowing them to list up to three destinations). Realising that a variety of reasons may prevent people from going to their most preferred destinations, we then asked “If you **had** to leave South Africa, which country would you **most likely** end up living in”?

Amongst all respondents, the United Kingdom is the leading destination, selected by almost three in ten respondents (24 percent said UK or England, and another 4 percent specifically said “London”). This was followed by the United States (19 percent), Australia (15 percent), “Europe” (7 percent), and Canada (5 percent). In total, 42 percent gave a European destination (including the UK). Other destinations included North America (23 percent), Australasia (17 percent), and Southern Africa (7 percent).

Table 3 highlights a few important racial differences. Black, White and Coloured respondents all agreed that they would most likely end up in Europe, while Indian respondents indicated that they were significantly less likely to end up in Europe. Black respondents are more likely to think they would end up in North America or Southern Africa than other students. White students are more likely than others to see Australasia as a likely destination.

Figure 4: Most Likely Destination (All Students)





Table 3. Most Likely Destination (by Race)

	<i>Black</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Coloured</i>	<i>Asian/Indian</i>
Southern Africa	13	3	3	2
Elsewhere in Africa	1	<1	0	0
Europe	46	44	50	32
North America	29	21	21	19
Australia/ New Zealand	8	31	20	24
Asia	4	2	7	23
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Examining these destinations according to emigration potential, we see a slight tendency for agreement on destination to be more concentrated amongst those who have the firmest commitment to leave--the 2 percent with “very high” emigration potential--who choose the UK (43 percent) and the US (21 percent). There is a wider spread of destinations amongst those with weaker commitments (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Most Likely Destinations (By Emigration Potential)



5.2 How long will they stay?

At this stage of their career, a high emigration potential amongst students does not yet translate into a permanent skills loss for the country. It is true that amongst those students who definitely want to leave--the 2 percent with “very high” emigration potential -- the vast majority (74 percent) say they want to stay in their most likely destination for more than five years. However, the quarter of the sample with a “high” emigration potential--24 percent, seem to envision a more limited stay, at least at first: one third (34 percent) of these students say they want to stay more than five years and the average (median) “high” emigration potential respondent plans on a stay of 2 to 5 years (41 percent).

Figure 6: Length of Intended Stay (by Emigration Potential)





Figure 7: Frequency of Return and Remittance (by Emigration Potential)




In addition, the average (median) respondent with either “high” or “very high” emigration potential plans on returning to South Africa on an annual basis. Those most likely to leave still plan on sending money home on a monthly basis.

5.3 Desire to maintain Links with South Africa

Possibly because younger people have not yet put down firm roots of their own, significant proportions of those students most likely to emigrate appear ready to give up any assets they might have in the country. Two thirds (65 percent) of “very high” emigration potential respondents and one half (47 percent) of “high” potential students are willing to give up their home in South Africa (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Willingness to Give Up Assets in South Africa (by Emigration Potential) - % Willing / Very Willing




Most “very high” emigration potential respondents would be “willing” (32 percent) or “very willing” (32 percent) to take all their possessions out of South Africa. “High” potential students are evenly split on the matter, but all other lower categories of emigration potential would be unwilling to do this if they had to relocate. We see roughly the same patterns when the question turns to

taking “all your assets” out of South Africa, with two thirds of very high potential respondents (67 percent) so willing, compared to only 40 percent of “high” potential and 37 percent of “moderate” potential students. Finally, while one half (51 percent) of “very high” potential students are willing to give up citizenship, only 24 percent of “high” probability students and far less of all other categories are willing do so.

5.4 Willingness to put down Roots in the New Country

While students may be willing to pull up roots that are not yet deeply planted in South African soil, we see only moderate levels of desire amongst likely emigrants to put down deep roots in their most likely destination. There is no overwhelming desire for citizenship or permanent residence, and even less for other indicators of a long-term stay, such as retiring in that country or a willingness to be buried there.

Figure 9: Willingness to Put Down Roots in New Country (by Emigration Potential) - % “To a Large Extent”



Differences by emigration potential are pronounced, especially when we ask about longer duration stays in the most likely destination. Six in ten “very high” potential respondents express a strong desire to retire in that country, whereas the median respondent in all other categories of emigration potential say they want this “hardly at all.” Less than half of “very high” potential respondent want to be buried in their most likely destination (40 percent), indicating that even among this group, most students cannot envision a total break with South Africa. Most “high” potential and “moderate” potential students do not want to be buried in another destination.

6. The Lost Investments of Potential Skills Loss

What kinds of investments does the South African government stand to lose if likely emigrants do in fact leave? We first look at investments in the form of bursaries. According to students’ present dispositions, the South African government will lose about 1 to 2 percent of final year students who have bursaries that do not require any payback, and approximately five percent of those that require some payback. Universities and Technikons also stand to lose about five percent of their investments in bursaries. However, these number would rise drastically to as high as between one quarter and one third of government bursaries if the “high” potential students also leave.

What about investments in specialised technical training? While a great deal of public attention has focused on the impacts of skilled emigration on the medical profession, our results indicate that the greatest losses may be amongst certain sectors of Technikon trained students, especially those training in Information Technology (see Figure 11).

Figure 10: Potential Loss of State Investments (by Type of Bursary)





Figure 11: Potential Losses of State Investments (By Course of Study)



7. Who Is Most Likely To Leave?

In the rest of this paper, we turn to examine the causal factors that may increase or decrease emigration potential. We examine six different “families” of factors.

- First, we examine a series of demographic variables to see whether one’s emigration potential is simply a function of one’s place in the *social structure*. For example, are people’s behaviours and predispositions shaped simply by their racial or ethnic background, their gender, or their socio-economic status?
- Second, we examine a set of measures related to *social identity*, specifically looking at factors surrounding national identity and patriotism. Here we ask whether affective ties to one’s country constitute a type of social glue that may inhibit emigration.
- Third, we test the impact of a wide range of *economic evaluations* usually grouped in the migration literature under the rubric of “push / pull” factors. Here we ask whether, regardless of how strongly they feel about their country, people leave due to intense dissatisfaction with personal and national conditions? Specifically, we examine students’ expectations of their future in South Africa, and their relative comparisons of South Africa with their most likely destination.
- Fourth, we test a series of factors related to *experience and information* about emigration and the outside world. Here we ask whether students with more contact with émigrés or who gather more information about emigration are more likely to leave.
- And finally, we test the role of *logistic* factors: to what extent is emigration related simply to the ability to move?


7.1 Social Structure

We begin by looking at demographic factors to assess the extent to which one’s emigration potential is simply a function of one’s place in South Africa’s social structure. Given the country’s history, the most obvious starting point is race. Due to their loss of dominant political and economic power and perceptions of reduced employment opportunities due to affirmative action, it is widely assumed that white South Africans are much more likely to leave than blacks. Yet Mattes & Richmond (2000: 25) found that there was no significant racial

difference in the proportions of skilled adults with a “very high” emigration potential (2 percent of each group), though there was a noticeable difference amongst those with a “high probability” (11 percent of whites compared to 6 percent of blacks).

In this present study, we do find a statistically significant difference, but one with little substantive importance. In fact, racial differences in emigration potential account for less than one percent of total variation in emigration potential across all people.³

Figure 12: Emigration Potential (by Race)




We also found a statistically significant differences according to home language, with English speakers (1.64) registering the highest emigration potential and Shangaan speakers the lowest (1.29). But again, these differences are hardly important in substantive terms.⁴

³ Eta = .087, p<.002.

⁴ Eta = .120; p<.003.

Figure 13: Emigration Potential (by Home Language)



In fact, we find few substantively meaningful differences across a range of demographic factors. There is no statistically significant difference by gender⁵ And while one might expect that those students from wealthier background would have more economic freedom to leave, we only find small differences according to self reported class background of student: those students who say they are from “upper middle class” families have a significantly higher emigration potential (1.59 on a scale of 0 to 3) than those from “working class” (1.52) or “lower class” (1.47).⁶

⁵ Eta = .041; $p < .065$.

⁶ Eta = .112; $p < .000$.

Figure 14: Emigration Potential (by Self-Described Class Background)






Figure 15: Emigration Potential (by Area)



Students from rural backgrounds (1.43) or small towns (1.43) are less likely to emigrate than those who come from urban areas (1.61), but again the difference is not very large.⁷

Recalling the results displayed in Figure 11, there is some evidence that differing courses of study seem to make some students think they are more attractive in the international job market than others. But in contrast to popular perceptions that medical students are the most likely to leave, we find that students pursuing final year studies in Computer Science / Information Technology at Technikon (1.73) and studying in Medical or Dental faculties at Technikons (1.74) are the most likely to want to leave. Students studying in Nursing Training Colleges display the lowest emigration potential (1.29). Students studying in University Faculties of Medicine or Pharmacy (1.53) have an average emigration potential. But it bears repeating that these differences across degree paths are not very large in substantive terms.⁸ Finally, students at Technikons have a significantly higher emigration potential (1.63) than university (1.48) or nursing college (1.29).

Figure 16: Emigration Potential (by Type of Institution)



⁷ Eta = .109, p=<.000.

⁸ Eta = .169; p=<.000. Those studying IT at university are also more likely to leave (1.81) but there are only 20 cases in this category, insufficient for reliable analysis.

7.2 Social Identity

The common wisdom holds that South Africa's brain drain would be much slower if skilled South Africans were more patriotic with higher levels of national identity. Perhaps the most visible manifestation of the common wisdom was expressed by President Nelson Mandela, who in a 1999 interview with the SABC stated that South Africans who left the country had no loyalty or patriotism (SABC, 4 May 1999). This attack came three years after he had launched a campaign to invite South Africans who had left the country to come back. Perceiving the campaign to have failed, he pronounced, "Let them go. In that process we are convinced that the real South Africans are being sorted out. The real South Africans are those who are saying 'this is our country'" (*Cape Times*, 24 September 1998).

Following Heller, we conceptualise patriotism to include pride and love of one's country, a desire for its welfare; and a willingness to serve it and make sacrifices in its service (Heller, 1996: 951). We then designed a number of question items designed to tap into each aspect of the broader concept.


The majority of South African tertiary students exhibit a high degree of national identity and patriotism. Eight in ten agree that it "makes you proud to be called a South African" (83 percent) and that they have a "strong desire to help build South Africa" (79 percent). Two thirds agree that they would want their children "to think of themselves as South Africans" (76 percent) and that they have a "duty to contribute your talents and skills to the growth of South Africa" (73 percent). Seven in ten (71 percent) agree that "Being a citizen of South Africa is a very important part of how you seen yourself." At the same time, these levels of national identity are substantially lower than those measured amongst ordinary adult South Africans, where over nine in ten have consistently registered strong levels of national identity since 1994 (see Mattes, 2003). Whether younger, more educated people are simply always less likely to exhibit very high levels of patriotism, or whether these results portend a slow, secular decline in patriotism in the future, is a subject for future research.

The patterns of responses to these items tap a single common underlying concept that we feel confident to call *Patriotism*.⁹ While we found that there was little difference by race group in terms of emigration potential, we do find substantial differences on this scale, with white final year tertiary students

⁹ These five items have an Eigenvalue of 3.14 and explain 62.8 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .85.

exhibiting far lower levels of patriotism (3.74 on a scale of to 5) than black students (4.43), with coloured (4.07) and Indian (3.98) students in between.¹⁰ It is important to note that white students are not *unpatriotic*, but merely that their levels of patriotism are lower than other students.


Figure 17: Patriotism / National Identity (All Students)



Responses to two other items suggested that even while they feel patriotic towards South Africa, students in a globalising world have competing loyalties toward their profession and competing priorities related to achieving a certain quality of life. Just 17 percent disagreed with the statement that they “have more in common with people from other countries working in your profession than with people from South Africa” (though only 38 percent disagreed, with the balance saying they neither agreed nor disagreed). Six in ten (62 percent) agreed that “It really does not matter where you are a citizen as long as you have a good quality of life,” and just one in five (22 percent) disagreed.

¹⁰ Eta = .435; p<.000.

Figure 18: National Identity in Context (All Students)




From a different perspective, some have maintained that South Africans from minority groups (white, coloured and Indian) may leave the country because while they personally feel strongly about their South African identity, they also feel that they do not have a real role to play in the new South Africa. Overall, just 3 percent each say that people of their race, people who speak their language, or themselves personally have “no role at all” to play “in the future of South Africa” and another 9 to 10 percent answer that they have only a “minor role.” These three items tap a common underlying dimension that we interpret to measure *Perceptions of a Future Role in South Africa*¹¹ (the two items measuring whether one feels closer to other professionals, or places more value on quality of life fit with neither this nor the patriotism scale and will be retained as individual predictors). While students across all racial groups tend to see a role for themselves in the future of the country, black students are more likely to see this (a mean of 2.62 on a scale of 0 to 3) than coloured (2.34), white (2.23) or Indian (2.21) students.¹²

¹¹ These three items have an Eigenvalue of 2.06 and explain 68.7 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) = .77.

¹² Eta = .295; p,=.000.

Figure 19: Future Role in Country (All Students)



We have evidence that each of these sets of attitudes matters in terms of emigration potential. Respondents with higher levels of patriotism have substantially lower emigration potential (Pearson's r – a product-moment correlation coefficient = $-.235$). Feeling they have a role to play in the future of the country also leads to lower emigration potential ($r = -.130$). Whether students feel closer to their national rather than their professional identity ($-.121$) and whether they emphasise national identity over quality of life ($-.171$) also contributes to lower emigration potential.¹³

7.3 Economic Evaluations

Analyses of skilled emigration have often drawn distinctions between “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors are seen to be those sources of dissatisfaction in the home country that cause, or push skilled workers to emigrate (Willis, 1974: 1). Push factors have been seen to include everything from lack of good jobs for highly skilled workers, uncompetitive wages, limited opportunities for women, a

¹³ All correlations significant at $p \leq .000$.

frustrating work environment with little supportive infrastructure or innovation; to even boring social environments (Abella, 1997: 53; Aderinto, 1978: 320; and Khadria, 1999: 7, 12 & 37). Pull factors are seen as aspects of the receiving country that are attractive to the emigrant, such as opportunities for higher education; opportunities for gainful employment; higher salaries and living standards; and the fulfilment of occupational or professional aspirations (Aderinto, 1978: 76; Weis 1998: 76).

However, we feel that almost any specific feature of national life could conceivably be either a push *or* pull factor, depending on whether it is viewed in a generally negative or positive light. To make things even more complicated, the very same factor can be a push factor to some, and a pull factor to others. While it might be useful to only think of push factors as relating to the host country and pull factors relating to the receiving country, few people ever think about the qualities of a likely emigration destination in isolation; most *compare* those features with conditions in their own country, and it is the relative comparison that is ultimately important.

Thus, we tested student perceptions on a range of features of life in South Africa, looking at present satisfaction with personal and national economic conditions, and then asking them whether things in South Africa would be better or worse in five years time than they are today across a whole range of specific features of national life. Finally, we asked students to assess whether each factor would be better in South Africa or in their most likely destination.

7.3.1 Views of South Africa and the Future

One half of all students (47 percent) were dissatisfied with their present personal economic conditions, though this may be understandable given the lives most students lead. However, eight in ten (82 percent) expected that their personal economic conditions would be better or much better in five years. About half felt that their level of income (47 percent) would be better. In a similar pattern, six in ten (59 percent) were dissatisfied with current national economic conditions, but most (47 percent) felt things would get better in five years time and 27 percent said they would get worse.

However, once we asked people what they thought things would look like in five years time across a range of more specific elements of national life, perceptions were decidedly more pessimistic.

Eight in ten said the HIV/AIDS situation (80 percent) would be worse and two thirds felt the cost of living (67 percent) would get worse. Six in ten forecast that their ability to find the job they want (58 percent), their personal safety (58 percent), and their family's safety (58 percent) would all be worse rather than better than they are today.

One half foresaw deterioration in terms of upkeep of public amenities such as parks and beaches (49 percent), and four in ten expected things to deteriorate with regard to availability of affordable quality products (44 percent) the security of their job (39 percent), level of taxation (40 percent), and the future of children (40 percent).


While on no item do we find a preponderance of optimistic expectations, we do find more of a balanced split with regard to students' expectations about their ability to find the house they want (36 percent said things would be worse in five years, but 28 percent say they would be better), a good school for their children (35 percent worse, 32 percent better), medical services for their family (36 percent worse, 31 percent better), or the future quality of customer service (32 percent worse, 31 percent better), and their own prospects for professional advancement (31 percent worse, 30 percent better).

Perhaps most important of all, only 41 percent of the country's final year tertiary students, as of 2003, felt that it would be easy or very easy for them to find a job in their field of study after graduation. Eight in ten (81 percent) feel government has not done enough to create jobs for graduates.

The responses to fifteen of these items fall in a sufficiently similar pattern to allow us to create a single index that measures the level of *Pessimistic Expectations of Quality of Life* in South Africa.¹⁴

¹⁴ The single scale composed of these fifteen items has an Eigenvalue of 8.12 and explains 54.2 percent of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .94.


Figure 20: Pessimistic Expectation of Life in SA (All Students)



Importantly, the two items on safety garner significantly different patterns of responses and cannot be included in this index: thus, we construct a composite measure from these two items that measures *Pessimistic Expectations of Safety* in South Africa.¹⁵ A range of other individual items about whether people expect to be able to find jobs, whether government has done enough to create jobs, and satisfaction with present national economic conditions and evaluations of personal economic conditions do not load with either scale and are thus retained as individual items to predict emigration potential.

¹⁵ The correlation between these two items is an almost perfect .96, with reliability = .98.

Figure 21: Pessimistic Expectation of Safety in SA (All Students)



We find that pessimistic expectations of quality of life are indeed positively correlated to higher degrees of emigration potential ($r=.181$), as are pessimistic expectations of safety ($r=.160$).¹⁶ However, emigration potential is only weakly associated with personal economic dissatisfaction ($r=.061$)¹⁷ and national economic dissatisfaction ($r=.063$).¹⁸ We can find no statistically significant link between emigration likelihood and whether or not one thinks it will be easy to find a job,¹⁹ personal economic pessimism,²⁰ or dissatisfaction with government efforts to create jobs.²¹

¹⁶ Both correlations are significant at $p < .000$.

¹⁷ $p < .006$.

¹⁸ $p < .005$.

¹⁹ Pearson's $r = -.061$; $p < .06$.

²⁰ Pearson's $r = -.024$; $p < .282$.

²¹ Pearson's $r = .032$; $p < .187$.

7.3.2 Relative Comparisons of South Africa with Students' Likely Destinations

Yet regardless of whether students expect conditions in South Africa to get worse or better, they would have no reason to leave if they consider that even deteriorating conditions in this country are better than whatever they will find elsewhere. We thus asked the students to look at each of the factors reviewed above in terms of whether they think these conditions would be better in South Africa or in their most likely destination. Overall, the results indicate that a large number of final year students see the grass to be much greener on the other side. In contrast to the broad single scale formed by the items on future expectations within South Africa, the pattern of responses to these items are sufficiently distinct to warrant creating four different indices.

Three quarters of students are certain that they would enjoy a higher income (76 percent) in their most likely destination. Solid majorities say things would be better elsewhere in terms of their prospects for professional advancement (59 percent), their ability to find a desired job (56 percent), as well as their job security (54 percent). Roughly four in ten (41 percent) feel that the cost of living would be better elsewhere and they would also pay a fairer level of tax (41 percent). These six items form a unique scale that we interpret to measure *Relative Comparisons of Financial Prospects*.²²

The majority of students consider that their ability to find quality medical services for their family (55 percent) and a good school for their children (50 percent) would be better elsewhere. Opinion is more evenly divided when it comes to their expected ability to find a good house (37 percent say it would be better elsewhere, but 27 percent say it would be better in South Africa). Overall, just under a majority felt that their children would have a better future (47 percent) in their most likely destination than in South Africa. Responses to these four items form a separate scale that we interpret to measure *Relative Comparisons of Family Prospects*.²³

²² The scale created by these six items has an Eigenvalue of 3.00 and explains 50.0 percent of the common variance. Reliability / Cronbach's Alpha = .80.

²³ The scale created by these four items has an Eigenvalue of 2.55 and explains 63.7 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .81).

Figure 22: SA Vs. MLD: Financial Prospects (All Students)






Figure 23: SA vs. MLD: Family Prospects (All Students)



Two thirds feel that public amenities like parks and beaches would be better maintained elsewhere (65 percent), and that the HIV/AIDS situation would also be better (63 percent). The majority also expect to have an easier time finding affordable quality products (57 percent), and customer service quality (54 percent) in their most likely destination. These four items form a scale that we interpret to measure *Relative Comparisons of Quality of Life*.²⁴


Figure 24: SA vs. MLD: Quality of Life (All Students)



Finally, two thirds think that they (66 percent) and their family (65 percent) would be safer elsewhere. As with future forecasts of life in South Africa, these *Relative Comparisons of Safety* form their own composite measure.²⁵

²⁴ The scale created by these four items has an Eigenvalue of 2.56 and explains 63.6 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .81).
²⁵ The two items are almost perfectly correlated (.94) with a reliability of .97.

Figure 25: SA vs. MLD: Safety




A final form of relative economic evaluations involves student perceptions, not of how *they* would do, but rather how *those who have already left* are doing in their new countries. As we will demonstrate below, large proportions of South African students have direct exposure to at least one person who has emigrated. Consistent with the green coloured glasses through which South Africa’s students see the foreign grass, six in ten respondents believe that the lives of “those people who have left South Africa permanently” were now “better” or “much better” “than they were when living in South Africa” (62 percent). Just 6 percent believe these people were worse off. Few students believe that émigrés end up doing work for which they were not trained: just 3 percent say this; 73 percent believe that at least some are working in their intended fields, and 13 percent say that all emigrants are so employed.

The students’ emigration potential increases predictably as they conclude that they would enjoy better financial prospects ($r=.280$), better family prospects ($r=.261$), a better quality of life ($r=.220$) and will be safer in their most likely destination ($r=.179$). Finally, emigration potential increases sharply to the extent that students believe that émigrés lead better lives in their new countries

($r=.271$) and less so to the extent that they feel that émigré’s skills have been optimised ($r=.147$).²⁶

Figure 26: Do Emigrants fare Better? (All Students)



7.4 Information and Experience


Beyond people’s emotional attachment to their own country or their rational assessments of conditions in their own country and their target destinations, another factor that may shape emigration potential is simply their level of information about and contact with the act of emigration.

²⁶ All correlations are significant at $p \geq .000$.

7.4.1 Personal Experience with Emigration

Large numbers of the students we interviewed reported at least some direct or indirect experience with emigration. Six in ten said that they knew at least one fellow student or colleague (58 percent) or close friend (58 percent) who had left the country permanently. One half of all students had at least one member of their extended family (46 percent) emigrate. And one quarter said that someone in their immediate family (24 percent) had done so. These four items tap a single underlying dimension of *Personal Contact With Emigration*.²⁷

Figure 27: Contact with Emigration (All Students)



Emigration potential is modestly related to the extent that students know people who have already emigrated ($r=.219$).²⁸

²⁷ The scale created by these four items has an Eigenvalue of 2.28 and explains 60 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = .75).


²⁸ All correlations are significant at $p \geq .000$.

7.4.2 Experience with the Outside World

Do students make their decision on the basis of an idealised or romanticised vision of what life is like on the other side, or have they actually spent meaningful time in the countries they say are their most likely destination? To what extent are these student's views of emigration and the outside world based on real experience (through travel) rather than vicarious experience via the stories they hear from departed friends and families, or through the news media?

In their study of skilled adults, Mattes & Richmond (2000: 33) found that South Africans tended to form preferences about emigration that had little to do with whether or not they themselves had ever been outside of the country to visit the places to which they dreamt of moving. In the 1998 study, we found that extremely small proportions travelled regularly (once a year or more) to other African countries (3 percent), Europe (7 percent); North America (3 percent); Australia and New Zealand (2 percent) or Asia (1 percent).

Figure 28: International Travel (All Students)



In contrast, South Africa's tertiary students have far higher levels of regular contact with Africa (34 percent travel to Southern Africa at least once a year, and 8 percent do so elsewhere in Africa). But regular contact with frequently

listed likely destinations like Europe (4 percent), North America (2 percent), or Australia / New Zealand (1 percent) is just as low as for adults.

These items form two distinct scales of *African Travel* (Southern Africa, and elsewhere in Africa)²⁹ and *Overseas Travel* (to Europe, North America, Australasia and Asia).³⁰ Perhaps in contrast to expectation, emigration potential is only weakly related to the extent to which students travel in Africa (.068)³¹ or overseas (.077).³²

7.4.3 Information about the Outside World

We asked a number of different items about various aspects of information acquisition which can create three composite measures.

First of all, one quarter of the students interviewed say they “often” obtain information about job opportunities from family (23 percent) or co-workers (24 percent) and one third say they “often” obtain information from fellow students (37 percent). Approximately one in three say they get information about living conditions from co-workers (30 percent) or their family (33 percent) and one half get it from friends or fellow students (48 percent). These items form a valid and reliable scale of *Obtaining Information About the World Through Personal Networks*.³³

While one half say they “often” get information about job opportunities from newspapers and magazines (48 percent), less than one in five use television or radio (17 percent). One half often obtain information about living conditions from newspapers and magazines (53 percent). But in contrast to job opportunities, six in ten say they “often” obtain information about living conditions in other countries through television or radio (60 percent). These four items form a separate scale of *Obtaining Information About the World Through News Media*.³⁴

²⁹ These two items are moderately correlated (.38) with a reliability score of .50.

³⁰ The scale created by these four items has an Eigenvalue of 2.61 and explains 65.1% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha = .80).

³¹ $p < .003$.

³² $p < .001$.

³³ The scale created by these six items has an Eigenvalue of 3.21 and explains 53.5 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.83).

³⁴ The scale created by these four items has an Eigenvalue of 1.99 and explains 49.8 percent of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=.66).

Finally, 45 percent seek information about job opportunities and 44 percent seek information about living conditions through the internet. These two items form a distinctive composite scale of *Obtaining Information About the World Through the Internet*.³⁵

There is a modest relationship between higher levels of emigration potential and higher frequency of seeking out information about conditions abroad via the internet ($r=.216$), personal networks ($r=.213$) and news media ($r=.149$).

7.5 Logistics

To what extent does emigration hinge on the simple issue of whether people are able to afford and plan this move? Large numbers do seem to think that emigration would not impose insurmountable obstacles. Over half of all final students believe that it would be “easy” or “very easy” to get a job (54 percent) in their most likely destination if they wanted to. Forty three percent say it would be easy to leave the country to work in their most likely destination. And one third (32 percent) believe that the costs of moving to that destination and finding a good home would be affordable; notably, one half (52 percent) say it would be unaffordable or “very” unaffordable. These three items tap a common underlying dimension that we can call *Ease of Leaving*.³⁶ A psychological element of logistics would simply be the extent to which people may feel they have the support of loved ones in making this move. Four in ten final year students say that their family would encourage them to leave South Africa (45 percent); just one in five (19 percent) say their families would discourage emigration.


As we expected, those people who feel that leaving South Africa would be easy and affordable have considerably higher emigration potential than those who think the effort would be daunting ($r=.236$).³⁷ Emigration potential increases sharply to the extent that students say that their families would encourage them to leave South Africa ($r=.394$).

³⁵ These two items are strongly related (.68) and form a very reliable construct (Alpha=.81).

³⁶ The scale created by these three items has an Eigenvalue of 1.69 and explains 56.5 percent of the common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) = .66.

³⁷ $p<.000$.

Figure 29: Physical and Psychological Logistics (All Students)



8. Multivariate Analysis

We have reviewed the bivariate connections between the possible factors that may help us account for and explain variations in emigration potential. We now use multivariate regression to examine which of those factors remain as important predictors of emigration once we take into account the impact of all other simultaneously. We use “blockwise entry” and enter in theoretical “families” of variables in groups to help us understand which set of factors contributes most to our understanding of emigration potential.

We can arrive at a relatively parsimonious model that explains 31 percent of emigration potential, a relatively strong result given that we are measuring the experiences of widely varying types of students across very different types of educational institutions (see Table 4). The single strongest predictor of emigration potential is simply whether or not students feel that their families would encourage or discourage their decision to move (Beta = .289, explaining on its own 19 percent of the variance of emigration potential). Students’

perceptions about the fortunes of those who have already moved are the second strongest set of predictors; particularly the belief that émigré's lead better lives (B = .127) and that they are working in the areas for which they were trained (B=.095).

Table 4: OLS Estimates of Predictors of Emigration Potential

	<i>r</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Adj. R² (Block)</i>	<i>Adj. R² (Cumul)</i>
<i>Constant</i>		.025	104			
<i>Social Structure</i>					.000	.000
<i>National Identity</i>					.078	.078
Index of Patriotism	-.258	-.093	.015	-.098		
Nat Identity More Important Than Q of L	-.179	-.034	.009	-.056		
<i>Economic Evaluations</i>					.152	.198
Relative Comparisons of Family Prospects	.298	.109	.013	.132		
Believes Emigrants Do Better	.283	.105	.013	.127		
Believes Emigrants Skills Optimised	.189	.136	.021	.095		
<i>Information and Experience</i>					.059	.223
International Travel	.099	.067	.021	.047		
Obtains Information Via Internet	.224	.098	.010	.139		
<i>Logistics</i>					.209	.308
Ease of Leaving	.249	.070	.013	.084		
Family Support	.430	.198	.011	.289		
<i>St. Error of Estimate</i>	.					.6114
<i>Adjusted R²</i>						.308

Notes:

1. All variables significant =/ $<.001$.
2. N = 3386.
3. The dependent variable is the *Index of Emigration Potential* (an average score composed of six different indicators of emigration).
4. Ordinary least squares regression estimates.

Relative economic assessments and national identity are about equal in impact, though they work in opposite effects. The belief that family prospects would be

better in one's most likely destination than in South Africa increase emigration potential (Beta = .132) while a sense of patriotism (-.098) and a belief that where you live is more important than quality of life (-.056) serve to decrease emigration potential.

Finally, logistic and informational factors have about equal impact. The more one seeks out information from the internet about the living conditions and job opportunities abroad (Beta = .139) and regularly travels internationally (.047), the greater one's probability of emigrating.³⁸ And the more one thinks that emigration would be manageable and affordable (.084), the more likely one is to emigrate.

Once all these factors are taken into account, no structural factors (like race, gender, language, or social class) has any statistically significant impact. Moreover, we see virtually no evidence of any of the so called "push factors" widely supposed to be driving South Africans out of the country, such as crime, economic pessimism, fall standards, mismanagement, or HIV/AIDS (e.g. Van Rooyen, 2000).³⁹

Rather it seems that some aspects of identified target destinations are more important in pulling South Africans out. However, these aspects are not the simple economic gain in the form of better jobs, higher salaries and living standard often supposed by migration theorists (e.g. Aderinto, 1978) or the fulfilment of occupational or professional aspirations (Weis, 1986), but rather the assessment of whether family prospects would be better than in South Africa (i.e. whether one would be better able to find a good school, house, and quality medical services, and whether one's child would face a better future). However students are much more likely to emigrate if they believe that émigré's lead better lives abroad and that their skills are being optimised.

³⁸ Though we could entertain plausible arguments that seeking information from the internet is as much a consequence of the decision to emigrate as a cause. If this variable is omitted, a third identity variable (whether people value national identity more than occupational identity) remains in the model but the overall explanatory strength of the model is slightly weaker ($R^2 = .29$).

³⁹ While this is usually based on popular wisdom, some systematic attempts have reached the same conclusions because they have only asked those who have already left the country and thus miss the fact that those who have not left also mention the same problems (Haldenwag, 1996; Statistics SA, 1998).

9. Will Restrictions Work?

Faced with such significant emigration levels, and given the common perception that emigration is a “loss”, it is understandable that governments are inclined to implement restrictive policies. Most analysts feel such policies are likely to hasten the rate of emigration even further and call for the extension of bilateral labour treaties, which have been widely used by South Africa for unskilled labour for decades, to skilled labour ensuring that both sending and receiving countries benefit equally (e.g. Cooper, 1997; Crush, 1997; Crush *et al*, 2000). The students we interviewed tend to agree with these arguments. Students generally believed that most forms of interventions would be unjustified, would not work, or would make it more likely that they would leave.

We asked those students with study bursaries whether the conditions of those bursaries required them to remain in the country after they completed their studies either in general, or to work specifically in either the public or private sector. Twenty two percent of all students had such a bursary: while these students do have a lower emigration potential (1.38) than others (1.54), the difference is very small, suggesting that these restrictions exercise a minimal impact on student plans and calculations.⁴⁰

Another type of government intervention is a requirement that students perform some form of national service in return for their education. In South Africa, the Health Department has required final year medical students since 2001 to do a year of community work. The ANC has since argued in its 2002 *Party Conference Manifesto* that this should be broadened to include other health and higher education professionals.

If handled well, and if specifically required of those students who had received some form of bursary, such restrictions would not meet with massive resistance, or make people more likely to leave. Just 18 percent say government would not be justified to require those who have received government bursaries to complete some form of national service in return for their bursary, and high emigration potential students are no more likely than others to think so.⁴¹ However, students would be far more opposed to other types of interventions. One half of students (51 percent) say government would not be justified if it required students to complete some form of national service before they began tertiary education. Fifty-three percent say government would not be justified if it required citizens to work in the country for several years after graduation, with

⁴⁰ Eta = .072; p=<.001.

⁴¹ Tau b = .033; p=<.073.

higher emigration potential students especially opposed.⁴² Six in ten say it would not be justified if government limited the amount of money you could send out of the country (57 percent), with higher emigration students more likely to be bothered.⁴³ Sixty percent say government would not be justified to make people pay taxes on income earned outside the country, again with high emigration potential students especially opposed.⁴⁴

In general, we find evidence that any government steps to make it more difficult to emigrate,⁴⁵ generalised requirements that all students leaving professional schools do a year national service in their area,⁴⁶ moves to limit people to one passport,⁴⁷ or increased fees for emigration documents⁴⁸ would all make it more or much more likely that the very high and high emigration potential students will leave.

Students feel there are far more effective ways to limit emigration. Three quarters agree that development and growth would reduce emigration (76 percent) and six in ten agree that measures to encourage the return of skilled national living abroad would also reduce emigration (59 percent). But just one quarter (27 percent) think legislation limiting the ability of state trained students to emigrate would actually reduce emigration, and students with higher emigration potential are even less likely to think so.⁴⁹ Just one fifth (22 percent) say that South Africa's efforts to discourage other governments from employing South African emigrants would reduce emigration. Finally, just one fifth think a legal prohibition of emigration would reduce the outflow of people.

⁴² Tau b = .146; p=<.000.

⁴³ Tau b = .108; p=<.000.

⁴⁴ Tau b = .146; p=<.000.

⁴⁵ Tau b = .230; p=<.000.

⁴⁶ Tau b = .220; p=<.000.

⁴⁷ Tau b = .199; p=<.000.

⁴⁸ Tau b = .199; p=<.000.

⁴⁹ Tau b = -.090; p=<.000.

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The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002. SALDRU conducted the first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development). More recently, SALDRU ran the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey (2000). Current projects include research on public works programmes, poverty and inequality.
